Tag attorney misconduct

Previously Paddled Attorney Chris Scileppi Tells an Arizona Superior Court Judge That This Blog’s Author Has “Terrorized” and “Demonized” His Clients with Computer Code—and Isn’t Jeered out of the Room

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What this post relates is typical of prosecutorial conduct in restraining order cases, besides generally. The imperative, which is both profligate and malicious, is simply to win. Neither merit nor justice has anything to do with it. The post revisits a 2016 hearing whose object was to have the writer jailed. To remind those who need reminding, namely, liberal proponents of wasteful litigation whose advocacy is based on sensationalized abstractions, jailed means locked in an iron-and-concrete kennel.

lizard

“See attached Exhibit A—wherein Defendant, via letter to one of Dr. Bredfeldt’s then supervisors [at the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality], explains that the intent of his blog is not to speak on restraining order abuse, as would be implied by its name, but rather to expose ‘Tiffany’s conduct and frauds…the ploys Tiffany used to camouflage her hanky-panky…so long as I’m burdened with Tiffany’s frauds, however, I intend nevertheless to keep lighting candles where I can as my time and energies allow.’”

—Tucson attorney Christopher Scileppi

Quick note: Excepting my bracketed interpolation, the quotation above is unaltered. That’s exactly how it appears, ellipses and all, in a brief to the court. Short addendum: Speech about misconduct that includes the abuse of restraining orders is speech “on restraining order abuse.” Superfluous postscript: Obviously.

This is one of several posts that enlarge on aspects of the writer’s most recent cases, which have concerned citizens’ constitutional right to freedom of expression. Procedures forerunning the July 15, 2016 hearing encapsulated here have been numerous and all of them related to the conduct described in the letter to Roberta Grant, Ph.D., quoted in the epigraph. That conduct is what inspired this blog. To conceal that conduct, I’ve been serially accused and prosecuted for 12 years.

A synopsis of the backstory, with links to corroborating statements given in evidence to the court by my accusers, Tiffany and Phil Bredfeldt, can be found in the preface here.

(In short, Tiffany Bredfeldt, a married stranger who hung around my house up to and past midnight for three months in 2005, told various courts over a seven-year period that I had been “nice” to her and a “friend,” that she “would not wear a wedding ring” while she was there, and that she had “never felt the need” to tell me she was married; but that I had made “several physical, romantic advances toward her,” “propositioned her,” and “ask[ed] for” or “offered her sex”; and that I was a “danger” to her husband and shouldn’t be allowed to talk to him. Readers without Ph.D.’s in science, at least, might detect some inconsistencies in these statements and wonder about the reason for them. Such readers might even think the reason is self-evident.)

The syntactic goulash quoted at the top of this post is the work product of the Law Office of Christopher Scileppi, the Tucson-based attorney employed by the Bredfeldts. Mr. Scileppi is distinguished for having been given a little squeeze by the mayor of Nogales in front of jurors at a rape trial, in which he represented one of the alleged assailants of a 15-year-old girl. The mayor who hugged him was later sent to prison for public corruption. Mr. Scileppi represented him, too. In 2014, Mr. Scileppi was suspended for 60 days and placed on six months’ probation for violating various ethical rules (ERs).

Christopher Scileppi, Chris Scileppi, Phil Bredfeldt, Philip Bredfeldt, Tiffany Bredfeldt

Dr. Roberta Grant—to whom the letter quoted in the epigraph was addressed and from whom I never got a reply—keeps classy company.

I was represented a specialist in constitutional law who has never been embraced by a politician in court—during a rape trial or otherwise.

The epigraph is a statement of Mr. Scileppi’s excerpted from a supplemental briefing to the court on a motion to dissolve a 2013 “prior restraint” that violated my First Amendment rights with shameless gusto (and that was issued by an Arizona Superior Court judge, Carmine Cornelio, who has since been shamed off the bench). It was the reason I’ve previously been circumspect about how I talk about my own case history on this site (pointlessly: The court’s order forbade me from publishing anything, ever, including by “word of mouth”). A prior restraint prohibits publications before they’ve been made; it extorts silence and conformity. The unlawful order of the court was the handicraft of Jeffrey Marks, another unscrupulous Tucson lawyer who represented the Bredfeldts in the most recent action…right up until the judge consented to appoint me counsel, whereupon Mr. Marks discovered he had more pressing concerns to attend to. Noteworthy is that Mr. Scileppi, Mr. Marks’s replacement, is a criminal lawyer (he represents, for example, alleged rapists).

The trial strategy of the plaintiffs has been a study in workarounds: If the law isn’t on your side, find ways to persuade the court otherwise.

In this instance, the plaintiffs alleged that the court shouldn’t consider my words on this site as “speech” but rather as “conduct.” Speech is protected by the First Amendment; conduct may not be.

Relative to this case, there is a clear difference between posting a blog entry to the Internet about the very real debate about whether restraining orders can be abused—which is what the Defendant claims to have been doing—and utilizing one’s blog to terrorize, demonize, harass, and defame another—which is what the Defendant has actually been doing since 2008. While this case involves Defendant’s use of the Internet broadly and tags specifically to make contact with and harass the Plaintiffs and their family, it is not the first time this issue has arisen in the law.

Mr. Scileppi’s argument was that “tags,” the keywords at the bottoms of posts that identify its topics, serve to “contact” anyone whose name appears among them. Tags don’t actually link to anything external to the website, so Mr. Scileppi directed the court’s attention to a case about a woman against whom a restraining order was issued who subsequently tagged comments she made on Facebook with the plaintiff’s name. In the comments, she called the plaintiff “sad” and “stupid.” Mr. Scileppi:

In People v. Gonzalez (New York Supreme Court 15-6081M) the victim had been granted an order of protection against his ex-girlfriend Maria Gonzalez, which ordered the defendant to “refrain from communication or any other contact, directly or indirectly through third parties, by mail, telephone, e-mail, voicemail, or other electronic or any other means.”

The plaintiff, in fact, was a woman, Gonzalez’s former sister-in-law. Either Mr. Scileppi was careless (for which he has previously been spanked), or he just adapted the details of the case to suit his purposes.

Facebook: “Tags in photos and posts from people you aren’t friends with may appear in Timeline review where you can decide if you want to allow them on your Timeline.” The woman who prosecuted her former sister-in-law for calling her and her family “sad” could instead have requested of Facebook that comments tagged by her not be included on her Timeline. One can’t but conclude that she wanted her to be punished by the criminal justice system…for calling her “sad.”

Ignoring the questions of what a miscreant someone has to be to want a woman jailed for calling her “stupid,” and whether such an allegation is worthy of the court’s time—which questions say a lot about both the value of restraining orders and why they’re sought—tagging on Facebook does cause a contact with the person tagged. That’s its purpose.

Tagging in blogs is in no way related (and even tagging on Facebook is defensible as protected speech; the court has held that “where comments are made on an electronic medium to be read by others, they cannot be said to be directed to a particular person,” that is, they cannot be called “contact” and therefore cannot be called “harassment”). Mr. Scileppi, whose law firm is on Facebook, knew that what’s called “tagging” on Facebook is distinct from what’s called “tagging” on a blog. Mr. Scileppi again:

While tags on Facebook may differ from the tags employed by the Defendant—the former are primarily understood to be direct contact while the latter are likely indirect contact—the fact remains that they are contact nonetheless.

You see how Mr. Scileppi’s style of lawyering works: You tell the judge what you want him or her to conclude. You sketch a false correspondence and only let on that the two things you’ve represented as analogous “may differ”…but not significantly.

They differ entirely. A section of my attorney’s competitive briefing to the court was titled, “Plaintiffs Misunderstand the Meaning of the Verb ‘Contact.’” I like this explanation from Chan v. Ellis (2015):

“To ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘to get in touch with; communicate with’” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Although one may “contact” another…by communicating with the other person through any medium, it nevertheless is essential that the communication be directed specifically to that other person, as opposed to a communication that is only directed generally to the public.

Also readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence is that a tag isn’t even a “communication”; tags just identify keywords in a communication to the general public, and a communication to the general public is protected speech.

Mr. Scileppi’s case to the court relied almost entirely on these words and brief phrases at the bottoms of posts that summarize their topics. He even loosely equated the use of HTML metatags with harassing person-to-person telephone calls. The “operator” said to place the calls was Google. The explanation ran something like this: Tags used on this blog were detected by Google, whose algorithm allegedly made posts more prominent among search engine returns for queries that included the terms in their tags. This in turn hijacked the plaintiffs’ public images and “created” a contact…or whatever.

In fact, Google doesn’t use lexical tags at all, whether to determine webpage hierarchies or for any other purpose, nor has it done for almost 10 years.

Based on the foregoing science fiction, given the veneer of credibility by an expert witness and garnished with protestations of terror and trauma, it was argued that I should be incarcerated while my father was dying. (Contrast the robotic feminist refrain, which should be heard in the voice of a sententious child and is summarized thus: False allegations are extremely rare and seldom have serious consequences.)

Horrific is that BS like this can actually snooker trial judges who don’t know better. Almost as horrific is that it’s meant to.

Copyright © 2018 RestrainingOrderAbuse.com

*I was an aspiring author of children’s humor when my seclusion was invaded by my accuser and some equally disturbed girlfriends of hers 12 years ago. My initials, which I had considered using as a pen name, are T. A. G.

Litigation Privilege: Why Restraining Order Fraud Is Pandered to and Why the Falsely Accused Are Denied Recourse to the Law for Vindication, Relief, and Recovery of Damages

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“Fraud is deliberately deceiving someone else [including a judge] with the intent of causing damage.”

—Cornell Legal Information Institute

“Generally, lying during trial (or any other part of litigation) is expected to come out at the time of trial. This means an action against someone for lying during a prior proceeding would fail because even lies are protected by the litigation privilege. You have to catch them at the time; you cannot attack them collaterally (in a different proceeding).”

—Attorney Catherine Elizabeth Bennett

Here are examples of restraining order fraud and repeated abuse of process (others are here and here, and comments and posts on this site are replete with them).

Here is the obstacle to obtaining relief from fraud committed by restraining order petitioners that the falsely accused face no matter how high up the judicial chain they muster the fortitude to climb:

  1. So-called protective orders were designed to allow battered women to apply directly to a judge for relief from household violence and intimidation. Their origin harks back to the late ’70s/early ’80s. When these orders were conceived 30 or 40 years ago, domestic violence was hush-hush, and (actual) victims faced alienation from their families for airing dirty laundry in public and rocking the boat. They faced, as well, the possibility of their claims’ being discounted by police or even ridiculed (compounding their misery and humiliation). So the middlemen (i.e., cops and prosecutors) were cut out of the process. Thus could allegations be made and ruled upon in the absence of any investigation. It seemed a reasonable stopgap at the time. Over the decades since, despite radical changes in how claims of domestic violence are received by the public and law enforcement (due in no small part to the investment of billions of federal tax dollars), the standards for substantiating an assertion of victimhood remain lenient, while what qualifies as grounds for a court injunction has steadily broadened. People now get orders against their friends, lovers, neighbors, moms, dads, kids, etc., and violence need not even be alleged; some claim of apprehension usually suffices. The process has morphed from a life-preserver for battered women with no other way out of a hellish situation to a sop to satisfy any complainant who fills out an application. Court policy pretends that anybody who walks into a courthouse with a beef (real or not) deserves a private audience with a judge to shield him or her from the terrors of public scorn or disapproval from the cops. Anyone with an ax to grind, that is, is treated like a battered woman circa 1979. So institutionalized has the process become, and so profitable to so many (both financially and politically), that no one questions whether this is ethical. So the restraining order process has become a game, a game played according to anachronistic rules. Maximum latitude is given to anyone (no fee or i.d. required) to litigate any claims s/he wants in a backroom conference with a judge, and rulings are issued ex parte, which means the person who’s accused is prejudged sight unseen. The due process rights of the accused are scotched. Grants under the Violence Against Women Act will explicitly forbid the use of lie detectors. The dictate is purely rhetorical; it’s meant to stress that what a complainant alleges shouldn’t be doubted. This expectation extends to any petitioner. Hence judicial scrutiny is minimal, and judges may actually bristle when the falsely accused allege that petitioners are lying. This is called fair and just.
  2. The idea behind “litigation privilege,” which basically ensures that whatever a litigant or his or her attorney alleges is protected from liability (from charges of defamation, for example), is the same: Accusers need to feel secure to air “the facts” without fear of prosecution.

The protections sketched above were not put in place to defend the right of any fraudster to falsely allege anything off the top of his or her head against a target of malice in a court of law. Perjury, after all, is a statutory crime. Lying isn’t condoned by the law, but it is swallowed by cops and defended by judges.

They’ve had their priorities impressed upon them in no uncertain terms.

So emphatic is the priority to give accusers the benefit of the doubt that people who’ve been wrongly accused have little or no credibility with judges and absolutely no recourse to sue for damages caused by false allegations (to reputation, employment, enjoyment of life, and health). The court doesn’t recognize there are any damages to being falsely accused of stalking, for instance, or violent threat, sexual harassment, assault, or even rape. False accusations that are dismissed as baseless are harmful enough (the stresses they cause are beyond quantification). When false allegations stick, the guilt of the accused is presumed, and subsequent legal actions they may venture to undertake (lawsuits and appeals) may be summarily tossed for lacking merit. In contrast, the merit of rulings that are typically the products of procedures lasting mere minutes isn’t questioned. Some judges will even hold that accusations litigated in court can’t constitute perjury because of the “litigation privilege” (i.e., because they were uttered in court instead of on, say, Facebook or the radio, they can’t be lies).

Accusers (all of them identified with battered women of 1979) must be free to claim whatever they want without fear of risk or blame—that’s the overriding precept. Translated, this means the court’s position is that people must be allowed to lie and snooker the court as they choose…and anyone who’s lied about be damned.

Copyright © 2015 RestrainingOrderAbuse.com

*From “‘Out of Left Field’: The Litigation Privilege Defense to Adverse Party Suits” by attorney Keith A. Call (emphases added):

Despite some authority characterizing the litigation privilege as “absolute,” it is certainly not without limits. There are some claims for which the litigation privilege is usually not a defense. Such claims may include malicious prosecution, fraud, criminal perjury, suborning perjury, and professional discipline. See, e.g., Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 81 P.3d 244, 259 (Cal. 2004) (the litigation privilege “operates to bar civil liability for any tort claim based upon a privileged communication, with the exception of malicious prosecution”); Bushell v. Caterpillar, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (litigation privilege does not provide immunity from criminal perjury); Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (litigation privilege is not bar to professional discipline or criminal perjury); Dello Russo v. Nagel, 817 A.2d 426, 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (litigation privilege does not insulate against malicious prosecution or professional discipline); N.Y. Cooling Towers, Inc. v. Goidel, 805 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (refusing to dismiss claims against adverse party’s attorney based on fraud and collusion); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864, 870-72 (W. Va. Ct. App. 2005) (litigation privilege does not immunize attorney from claims of fraud or malicious conduct).