EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE DEFENSE

PENAL LAW 125.25(1)(a) ¹ Effective September 1, 1967

PENAL LAW 125.27 (2) Effective September 1, 1995

If applicable, omit the final two paragraphs of the instructions on the crime charged, and substitute the following:

If you find that the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any one of those elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of Murder in the _____ degree as charged in the _____ count.

On the other hand, if you find that the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements, you must consider an affirmative defense the defendant has raised. That defense, if proved, does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for the homicide, but, under our law, it reduces the degree of the crime from Murder in the _____ degree to Manslaughter in the First Degree. Remember, if you have already found the defendant not guilty of Murder in the _____ degree, you will not consider the affirmative defense.

Under our law, it is an affirmative defense to a charge of Murder in the _____degree that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of that explanation or excuse is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. ²

The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance has three principal components.³

First, the defendant must have had an extreme emotional disturbance.

Second, in committing the homicide, the defendant must have acted under the influence of that extreme emotional disturbance.

Third, there must have been an explanation or excuse for such extreme emotional disturbance that was reasonable. The reasonableness of that explanation or excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.

Your determination of the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse must be made initially by determining the situation in which the defendant found himself/herself, including the circumstances as he/she believed them to be at the time, however inaccurate that belief may have been. Then, you must determine whether, from the viewpoint of a person in that situation, the explanation or excuse was reasonable.

Remember, it is not the act of killing that must be supported by a reasonable explanation or excuse. It is the extreme emotional disturbance for which there must be a reasonable explanation or excuse.

Under our law, the defendant has the burden of proving this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

In determining whether the defendant has proven the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, you must consider any relevant evidence whether introduced by the People or by the defendant.

A preponderance of the evidence means the greater part of the believable and reliable evidence, not in terms of the number of witnesses or the length of time taken to present the evidence, but in terms of its quality and the weight and convincing effect it has. For the affirmative defense to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the evidence that supports the affirmative defense must be of such convincing quality as to outweigh any evidence to the contrary.

- 1. Although the statute defines the defense as a defense to intentional murder, the Appellate Division has held that the defense applies to a charge of attempted murder. *People v. Lanzot*, 67 AD2d 864, 866 (1st Dept. 1979), app. dism. 49 NY2d 796 (1980); *People v. Tabarez*, 113 AD2d 461, 463 (2nd Dept. 1985) *aff'd on other grounds*, 69 NY2d 663 (1986); *People v. White*, 125 AD2d 932, 933 (4th Dept. 1986). The Court of Appeals has held that the defense is not applicable to depraved indifference murder. *People v. Fardan*, 82 NY2d 638 (1993).
- 2. See Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) and Penal Law § 125.27(2). See generally People v. Patterson, 39 NY2d 288 (1976), affd 432 US 197 (1977) (the affirmative defense is constitutional). People v. Casassa, 49 NY2d 668 (1980) and People v. White, 79 NY2d 900 (1992) (in each case, the defendant failed to establish the affirmative defense). People v. Walker, 64 NY2d 741 (1984) and People v. Roche, 98 NY2d 70 (2002) (in each case, the trial court properly declined to charge the affirmative defense). People v. Moye, 66 NY2d 887 (1985), People v. Tabarez, 69 NY2d 663 (1986) and People v. Harris, 95 NY2d 316 (2000) (in each case, the defendant was entitled to have the affirmative defense charged).
- 3. See *People v. Roche*, *supra*, 98 NY2d at 75-76; *People v. Harris*, *supra*, 95 NY2d at 319; *People v Casassa*, 49 NY2d 668 (1980); and other cases cited in note 1.